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whether or not the debt is “commercial”, perhaps the courts should 
make a more detailed examination of the particular transaction in 
determining this factor.
Notwithstanding that a definite policy approach to the 
question has yet to be clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court of 
Canada, this case stands as an indication that Canadian law seems 
to be moving towards the exclusion of sovereign prerogatives 
where Crown enterprise assumes a commercial complexion.
Alan D. Reid*
INSURANCE —  UNIFORM ACT —  CHANGE OF PREFERRED  
BENEFICIARY —  STATUTORY TRUST —  CAPACITY —  TEST OF 
INSANITY—TESTAMENTARY OR CONTRACTUAL.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal in the case of Re 
Rogers1 deals with a question of considerable interest. The point 
before the court was whether the designation of a preferred bene­
ficiary by the insured could be contested on the ground that the 
insured lacked capacity to make such a declaration. Although this 
issue has been raised before,2 few judges have attempted to 
describe the nature of the transaction by which a preferred bene­
ficiary is designated and the consequent test of mental capacity 
required, preferring, rather, to ground their decision on a more 
general issue: . . It comes down to this simply: Was the act 
mentally and physically really that of the donor?”3
Confining comment to the insurance aspect of the case the 
facts are as follows. In 1958, Rogers took out a policy of insur­
ance on his life naming his parents beneficiaries. By section 
141 ( 2 )4 of the British Columbia Insurance Act (this incorporates 
in substance, as do the Insurance Acts of the other common law 
provinces, the Uniform Life Insurance Act) the parents became 
preferred beneficiaries, and by section 147(1 ) 5 a statutory trust 
was created in their favour. On July 10, 1961, Rogers was 
married to the respondent. On October 11, 1961, he revoked the 
designation of his parents and by declaration named his wife as
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1 Re Rogers (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 141.
2 Book v. Book et al. (1900), 32 O.R. 206; Re Boeder and Canadian 
Order of Chosen Friends (1916), 36 O.L.R. 30; Clark v. Loftus, [1912] 
4 D.L.R. 39; Young v. Toronto General Trust Corp. et al., [1939] 4 
D.L.R. 766; Re Isaacs, [1954] O.R. 942.
3 Clark v. Loftus, [1912] 4 D.L.R. 39, per Meredith, J.A., at p. 52.
4 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197; R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 150(2).
5 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 156(1).
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beneficiary, as by section 148 of the Act0 he is permitted to do, 
his wife being also a member of the preferred class. The parents 
contested his declaration on two grounds, the first, that the 
respondent was not validly married to the insured. This aspect of 
the case is not considered here but the court found that there had 
been a valid marriage, and hence the nomination had not been 
made outside the preferred class. Secondly, it was said that the 
insured did not have mental capacity to change the beneficiary. 
The real effect of the insurance as between the insured and his 
parents was to confer on the latter a gift of the policy benefits. 
Such being the case the transaction should require the equiva­
lent of a testamentary capacity, similar to that set out in 
Banks v. Goodfellow.1 That the insured did not have such a 
capacity was suggested by the fact that for some time he had been 
undergoing psychiatric treatment, believed he was being persecuted 
by various people and was given to frequent outbursts of irrational 
behaviour. In addition, it was noted that the insured’s death was 
occasioned by suicide.
The trial judge, Ruttan, J., disposed of the case on the basis 
“that Rogers understood the nature of the document he was 
signing on October 12 and the effect such action would have on 
the disposal of his property”.8 This statement suggests that 
M r. Justice Ruttan considered the declaration of a beneficiary 
analogous to a gift, but subsequently he remarked: “My decision 
is not altered if I apply to this transaction the rules of testamentary 
capacity” .9
The Court of Appeal upheld in result the finding of the lower 
court. The court was divided, however, on the test of capacity to 
be applied. In the majority judgment Mr. Justice Wilson, with 
M r. Justice Davey concurring, said that the proper test of capacity 
should be testamentary, the requirements of which are set out in 
Banks v. Goodfellow.10
It is essential to the exercise of such a power that the testator 
shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall under­
stand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall 
be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he 
ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no 
disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense 
of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties— that no 
insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property 
and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been 
sound, would have been made.
6 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 157.
7 (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549, at p. 565, per Cockbum, C.J.
8 Re Rogers (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 661, at p. 671.
9 Ibid.
10 (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549, at p. 565, per Cockburn, C.J.
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Applying this rule to the evidence before him Wilson, J.A., was 
satisfied that Rogers did have the requisite mental capacity to 
make the designation.
Mr. Justice Sheppard, on the other hand, considered the 
declaration simply an alteration of a contract between the insured 
and the insuring company, its validity resting solely on the 
insured’s capacity to contract, which in turn is governed by the 
fairly stringent requirements set out in Imperial Loan Co. v. Stoneu 
“that to invalidate a contract a party must be so insane as to be 
incapable of understanding what he was doing at the time of the 
contract and such insanity must be known to the other party” .1* 
Mr. Justice Sheppard concluded by saying that since there was 
no evidence that the insured did not understand what he was 
doing, nor any suggestion that the insurance agent had reason to 
believe the insured mentally incompetent the declaration must 
stand.
The practical result of the contractual approach taken by 
Sheppard, J.A., is that if it is impossible to prove that an insurer 
or his agent knew or should have known that an insured was 
mentally incompetent, then, although the insured is clearly insane 
when he made the declaration designating a new beneficiary, that 
declaration must stand. Even this limited chance of success would 
disappear if the insured chose to make a “secret” declaration of 
beneficiary, which by section 144(1) of the Insurance Act13 he is 
permitted to do.
From a logical standpoint, however, the contractual approach 
has considerable merit. A life insurance policy is, first and fore­
most, a contract.14 At common law a beneficiary being a stranger 
to the contract could acquire no interest in the policy, either at 
law or in equity simply because the policy moneys were expressed 
to be payable to him.15 This has been altered by statute.
11 [1892] 1 Q.B. 599.
12 Re Rogers (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 141, at p. 145.
13 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197; R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 153(1).
14 Re Mendelson, [1940] 2 D.L.R. 382, per Baxter, C.J., at p. 387; 
Odgcrs, The Common Law of England, 2nd ed., vol. II, at p. 922; 
Laverty, F.J., The Insurance Law of Canada, 2nd ed., at p. 10.
15 Deckert v. The Prudential Insurance Company of America, [1943] 
O.R. 448, at p. 449; see also Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
Association, [1892] 1 Q.B. 147, per Lord Esher, M.R., at p. 152; 
Gunter v. Williams (1897), 1 N.B. Eq. R. 400, per Barker, J., at 
p. 403; Cornwall v. Halifax Banking Co. (1901-2), 32 S.C.R. 442,
per Sedgewick, J., at p. 446; Re Englebach (1924), 93 L.T. Ch. 616; 
McVitty, Commentary on the Life Insurance Laws of Canada, at 
p. 141.
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Section 1 4 4 (2 )10 of the Insurance Act allows the beneficiary to 
sue to enforce his rights under the policy. Section 147 (1 ) 17 which 
sets up a statutory trust in favour of a preferred beneficiary would, 
by implication, allow such a beneficiary to enforce the contract 
in his favour. But argues Mr. Justice Sheppard, “these are mere 
statutory additions to the policy created by the insuring company 
and the insured” .18 The wording of section 144(2) seems to support 
this view for it does not purport to make the beneficiary a party to 
the insurance contract; nor will it protect him if the insurer is able to 
set up some act of the insured’s in violation of the terms of the 
policy, as a defence to the beneficiary’s claim.
Thus if a beneficiary, being a stranger to the contract, wishes 
to contest the insured’s capacity to alter its terms, which is essen­
tially a matter between the insured and the insurance company, 
he should be bound by the contractual test of capacity, for his 
interest, limited by and defined in the contract taken out by the 
insured, will admit no other approach.
M r. Justice Wilson approached the question by examining 
the underlying intention of the Insurance Act. First, he noted that 
section 147 and 148 stipulate that when a preferred beneficiary is 
named, a statutory trust is established. Further, by section 148 
of the Act the insured may . . restrict, limit, extend, or transfer 
the benefits of the contract to any one or more of the class of 
preferred beneficiaries to the exclusion of any or all others of the 
class . . .” lfl From this he concluded that the real effect of the 
statute is to leave to an insured who has designated a preferred 
beneficiary only “a special power of appointment limited to a 
class, the power including the right to revoke previous appoint­
ments” ,20 and that being so, the question becomes which test of 
capacity, testamentary or contractual, would be the more appro­
priate. Examining the reasoning behind each test he states:
I think the real difference between the two classes of cases is 
this, that the contractor is required to be capable of appreciating 
his own interest whereas the testator is required to be capable of 
appreciating the interests of other persons, those interests consist­
ing of their claims to his bounty.21
From  this characterization he concludes that since the donee of a 
power is primarily concerned with the interests of others the 
proper test of capacity is testamentary.
16 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197; R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 153(2).
17 Ibid.
18 Re Rogers (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 141, at p. 145.
19 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197; R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 157.
20 Re Rogers (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 141, at p. 147.
21 Ibid., at p. 148.
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But while it is true that the insured may, when he designates 
a preferred beneficiary, retain a power analogous to  a special 
power of appointment,”  this approach disregards the fundamental 
point that the insured is still a party to the contract, and that the 
statutory trust which was created by the insured’s designation will 
always be subject to the terms of the contract from which it arose 
and may be defeated at any time by the neglect of the insured.”  
Thus in a more basic aspect the status of the insured is not merely 
that of a holder of a power of appointment but that of a party to 
a contract of insurance in which certain of his rights, among them 
power to change beneficiaries, have been set out by statute.*4 In 
addition, Mr. Justice Wilson’s characterization of contractual and 
testamentary interests is open to question, for while it is true that 
a contractor must be able to appreciate his own interests, the lack 
of such an understanding will not of itself provide grounds for 
the avoidance of a contract, for there must be the further fact 
that the other party was aware of the contractor’s mental state or 
the contract itself must be manifestly unfair.*5 This rule is not 
designed for the protection of a mentally incompetent contractor, 
for it contradicts the general requirement that there must be free 
and full consent to  bind persons in contract. Rather, its primary 
intent is to  uphold the sanctity of contract by providing that no 
man may stultify and disable himself so as to avoid his contract if 
the other party was not aware of his incapacity.”  It must be 
agreed, however, that with the exception of annuities, this 
approach is hardly amenable to contracts of life insurance which 
are rarely sought to be upset on the grounds of incapacity, for 
usually only the designation of a beneficiary is the point in 
question, and the contestants are not the parties to the contract 
but those named to receive its benefits. To determine these 
equities it is important to bear in mind the primary function of 
life insurance. That function is to allow an individual to make 
provision for his family upon his death.
22 Deckert v. The Prudential Insurance Company of America, [1943] 
O.R. 448, per Plaxton, J., at p. 454; see also Doull v. Doelle (1905),
10 O.L.R. 411, per Street, J.; Re Goatbe (1922-3), 53 O.L.R. 118, 
per Middleton, J., at p. 123; Cf. Re Boeder and Canadian Order of 
Chosen Friends (1916), 36 O.L.R. 30, per Meredith, C.J.C.P., at 
p. 35.
23 Youlden v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. (1913), 28 O.L.R. 
161, per Hodgins, J., at p. 173.
24 Re Mendelson, [1940] 2 D.L.R. 382, per Grimmer, J., at p. 389. This 
case dealt with an ordinary beneficiary but the same reasoning would 
apply to a preferred beneficiary.
25 Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, [1892] 1 Q.B. 599; Halsbury’s Laws of 
England, 2nd ed., vol. 21, p. 280.
26 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 29, pp. 406, 407.
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It is the protection of this interest that has concerned the 
framers of insurance legislation ever since 1865 when the legis­
lature of the Province of Canada passed “An Act to Secure to 
Wives and Children the Benefits of Assurance on the Lives of their 
Husbands and Parents” .”  By this enactment the insurance was to 
pass from the insured to his family “free from the claims of any 
creditor or creditors whomsoever” .** A  similar purpose was 
behind the statutory trust created by the Insurance Act20 in favour 
of a preferred beneficiary. The recently revised80 Uniform Life 
Insurance Act also affords this protection, but in a more satisfac­
tory way. The concept of the preferred beneficiary and its 
attendant trust, which proved to be so troublesome, have been 
eliminated. In their place are the following sections:
148. (1 ) Where a beneficiary is designated, the insurance 
money, from the time of the happening of the event upon which 
th* insurance money becomes payable, is not part of the estate of 
the insured and is not subject to the claims of the creditors of 
the insured.
(2 ) While a designation in favour of a spouse, child, 
grandchild or parent of a person whose life is insured, or any of 
them, is in effect, the insurance money and the rights and interests 
o f the insured therein and in the contract are exempt from
execution or seizure.81
For this reason the interest of an insured, although not strictly 
testamentary32 should be recognized as being analogous thereto. 
Consequently the mental capacity required of an insured should 
be no less strict than is the testamentary test of capacity. 
Certainly this is the approach favoured by many Canadian courts.33
27 29 Viet., c. 17.
28 Ibid.
29 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197, s. 147(1); R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, 8. 156(1).
30 The Uniform Life Insurance Act was completely revised in 1962. The 
new revision was enacted by all common law provinces and became 
effective in those provinces as of July 1, 1962.
31 R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 148, as amended by (1960), 9 Eliz. II, c. 41, 
s. 148.
32 D oyle  v. Doyle, [1929] 3 D.L.R. 796, per Haultain, C.J.S., at p. 798; 
In re Griffin, [1902] 1 Ch. 135, per Vaughan Williams, L.J., at p. 140, 
concerns the Friendly Societies Act which was the predecessor of 
much of our insurance legislation; Re Moran, [1910] O.W.N. 293, 
per Riddell, J„ at p. 294; Clark v. Loftus (1911), 24 O.L.R. 174, 
per Clute, J., at p. 180; [1912] 4 D.L.R. 39; cf. Garrow, J.A., at p. 55; 
Moss, C.J.O., considered the transaction similar to a gift, at p. 45; 
Meredith, J.A., considered the transaction was a contract or a gift, 
at p. 53. Kerslake v. Gray, [1957] S.C.R. 516, per Cartwright, J., at 
p. 526; Laverty, F.J., The Insurance Law of Canada, 2nd ed., 1936,
at p. 50.
33 Ibid.
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An equally interesting aspect of Mr. Justice Wilson’s decision 
is that it illustrates the evolutionary process of the law. During 
the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, the courts 
tended to look at life insurance as a purely contractual matter 
between the insured and the insurance company, governed by all 
the limitations of contract law, privity having the most far reaching 
implications.34 Nor did equity offer any relief, for it was seldom 
that a mere designation of beneficiary was considered sufficient 
affirmation of an intention to create a trust so as to enable a bene­
ficiary to enforce an insurance contract on his behalf.35 Thus the 
beneficiary was in the awkward position of having a “right” to 
receive the policy proceeds without a remedy to enforce their 
payment. Some courts have even suggested that if the insurance 
moneys were paid to the beneficiary he would hold them as a mere 
volunteer in trust for the estate of the insured.30 In addition, the 
benefits of a policy of insurance, like any other contractual right 
could be seized by the insured’s creditors for the payment of his 
debts. Clearly this approach, while it illustrates the vigour of the 
privity rule strikes at the rationale of modem life insurance prac­
tice. Remedial measures were required. First, the statutory trust 
was created to protect insurance benefits from creditors.37 Next, 
provision was made to give an ordinary beneficiary the right to 
maintain an action to enforce for his own benefit the payment of 
insurance money.88 The courts, too, have taken a hand by holding 
that the designation of an ordinary beneficiary constitutes a volun­
tary settlement by the insured in favour of the beneficiary thus 
making his claim superior to and exempt from the claims of
34 Deckert v. The Prudential Insurance Company of America, [1943] 
O.R. 448, at p. 449; see also Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
Association, [18921 1 Q B. 147, per Lord Esher, M.R., at p. 152; 
Gunter v. Williams (1897), 1 N.B. Eq. R. 400, per Barker, J., at 
p. 403; Cornwall v. Halifax Banking Co. (1901-2), 32 S.C.R. 442,
per Sedgewick, J., at p. 446; Re Engelbach (1924), 93 L.T. Ch. 616; 
McVitty, Commentary on the Life Insurance Laws of Canada, p. 141.
35 Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident Insurance Corporation of New York, 
[1933] A.C. 70, per Lord Wright, at p. 79.
36 Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, [1892] 1 Q.B. 147, 
per Lord Esher, at p. 151; Deckert v. The Prudential Insurance 
Company of America, [1943] O.R. 448, per Plaxton, J., at p. 449; 
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 22, p. 286; R. D. Taylor, 
“Beneficiaries of Life Insurance Policies” (1944), 22 Can. Bar Rev., 
at p. 509. See to the opposite effect: Cornwall v. Halifax Banking Co. 
(1901-2), 32 S.C.R. 442, per Sedgewick, J., at p. 447; Kerslake v. 
Gray, [1957] S.C.R. 516, per Cartwright, J., at pp. 254-5.
37 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197, s. 147(1); R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 156(1).
38 R.S.B.C., 1960, c. 197, s. 144(2); R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 153(2).
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creditors.89 The decision in the case of Re Rogers that the test of 
mental capacity to be required of an insured designating a bene­
ficiary of the preferred class is the testamentary test of capacity 
represents another step in this development. While the problem 
of explaining satisfactorily the legal principles which describe the 
status of the insured and the beneficiary still remains,40 the court 
in Re Rogers has admirably brought out the issues. The question 
remains whether this approach will be applied by the courts to the 
case of an ordinary beneficiary. Having regard io the protection 
now afforded such a beneficiary against the claims oi the insured’s 
creditors,41 it would seem likely that the courts will he no less 
diligent to protect him against an act dene by an insured who 
through mental incapacity has been rendered incapable of appre­
ciating his obligations “so as to bring about a disposal of his 
property which if his mind had been sound, would not have been 
made”.42
Douglas V. Wright*
39 In re Roddick (1896), 27 O.R. 573; In re Benjamin (1926), 59 O.L.R. 
392; In re Thompson, [1940] O.W.N. 546. In Kerslake v. Gray, [1957] 
S.C.R. 516, at p. 518, Kellock, J., giving the judgment of the court 
(Cartwright, J., dissenting) stated “. . . I am of opinion that s. 161 
[R.S.O. 1950, c. 153; R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 113, s. 153; R.S.B.C. 1960, 
c. 197, s. 144] operates to the same effect as regards ordinary bene­
ficiaries as s. 164 [R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 113, s. 156; R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 197, 
s. 147] does in the case of preferred. It has for a long time been
uniformly held in Ontario that insurance moneys payable to an ordinary 
beneficiary do not form part of the estate of the insured. Whatever 
criticism might have been directed at the decision, In re Roddick; 
Re Benjamin, and Re Jones [[1933] O.W.N. 48] (and I am not suggest­
ing that the appellant is not well founded in his criticisms of them) 
there is no basis for criticism since the enactment of s. 161(2) by 
1946, c. 42, s. 6 [R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 113, s. 153(2); R.S.B.C., 1960, 
c. 197, s. 144(2)].” See also Laverty, The Insurance Law of
Canada, 2nd ed., 1936, at pp. 529-30; In re Schebsman, [1944] 
Ch. D. 83, per Lord Green, at p. 89.
40 It is open to question whether the beneficiary has a mere expectancy 
or a vested interest subject to defeasance. If the former, the insurance 
might be likened to a testament;. however, unlike a testamentary 
disposition the insurance has immediate effect. If some vesting of 
interest in the beneficiary takes place then the insurance could be 
described as a gift, but unlike a gift the insurance benefit is not 
absolute in effect. Thus a policy of life insurance does not seem to 
fall into any convenient classification. Perhaps the Scottish concept, 
stated by MacGillivray, that a direction in a policy may operate with 
testamentary effect and so create a revocable destination which, in 
the absence of revocation, is effective to give a good title to the payee 
is most apt.
41 Supra, footnote 39.
42 Banks v. Goodfellow  (1870), L.R. 5 Q.B. 549, per Cockbum, C.J., 
at p. 565.
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